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Abstract:  This introduction to the special issue of the same title sets out the context for a 
critical examination of contemporary developments in sociotechnical systems deployed 
in the name of security.  Our focus is on technologies of tracking, with their claims to 
enable the identification of those who comprise legitimate targets for the use of violent 
force. Taking these claims as deeply problematic, we join a growing body of scholarship 
on the technopolitical logics that underpin an increasingly violent landscape of 
institutions, infrastructures and actions, promising protection to some but arguably 
contributing to our collective insecurity. We examine the asymmetric distributions of 
sociotechnologies of (in)security, their deadly and injurious effects, and the legal, ethical, 
and moral questions that haunt their operations. 
Within the anticipatory logics of state-based security, identification of the imminent 
threat is fundamental.  International security scholars have described the logics of pre-
emptive security as an “ontotheology,” that is “an a priori argument that proves the 
existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to 
be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it” (Der Derian 1995, 25).  While security 
conventionally has been framed as the evidence-based identification and assessment of 
danger informed by a causal logic and reliant on empirical analysis, threat identification 
is increasingly reconfigured by the United States and its European allies into the 
apparatus of a predictive, risk-oriented technoscience (Aradau et al. 2008; Amoore 2013).  
And with risks projected as limitless, demands for preemptive technosecurity measures 
expand.  At the same time, critics point out that claims for the precision of sociotechnical 
systems configured for the tracking and targeting of threats in the name of human 
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security are belied by their effects on the ground.  Critical analyses of US programs in 
particular are by now extensive, most visibly the use of drones by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Drawing upon documentation provided by 
non-governmental agencies like the Bureau of Investigative Journalismi and Reprieve,ii 
scholars have traced the CIA program of “targeted assassination” initiated in Yemen in 
November of 2002, and extended to Pakistan in June of 2004, as it moved from the 
execution of named individuals to strikes based on “signatures” or “patterns of life.” As 
of August 2017, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism had recorded a minimum of 
3,734 confirmed drone strikes, with the total persons killed estimated at between 6,562 
and 9,561, including from 753 to 1,427 civilians.iii     
A growing body of scholarship within science and technology studies (STS) and 
cognate fields is committed to examining the material and discursive infrastructures that 
hold the logics of (in)security in place, as well as the practices through which those logics 
realize their effects (see for example Cohn 1987; Mackenzie, 1993; Edwards1996; 
Ghamari-Tabrizi 2000; Gusterson 2007; Rappert 2007; Rappert et al. 2008; Lawson 
2011; Plotnick 2012; Masco 2014). These studies make evident the inherent 
contradictions and irremediable fault lines that render security regimes open to failure in 
their own terms.  In the process, they help to identify that which eludes the grasp of 
securitization, understood not as an overflow that needs to be contained, but as the space 
of possibility for other, more just, inclusive and effective avenues towards human (and 
more than human) security.        
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Security as predictive technoscience 
The shift of security regimes from a reactive to a proactive mode is at the heart of 
contemporary state-based logics focusing on technological superiority and persistent 
surveillance.  Surveillance aimed at the control of space, movement, and behavior is an 
increasingly normalized aspect of everyday life.iv  “Unmanned” aerial systems with high-
resolution sensors and interception capabilities––in conjunction with technologies such as 
earth observation satellites, biometrics, data mining, profiling, and population metrics––
are components of sociotechnical systems in which military and policing operations 
converge (Hayes 2009). Historically, in the arsenal of the state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence the military occupied its own distinct position, as the state’s 
armed force charged primarily with defense and the prosecution of war. The policing of 
human movement was delegated to other agents of sovereign authority whose means and 
ends were different than those of the army (Torpey 2000). Today the distinction between 
the tasks of the military and the policing of populations, territory and borders is 
disappearing (Jones and Johnson 2016). Together the military and other agents of state 
and private security configure a “regime of technologically enhanced identification 
techniques” (Ruppert 2009, 4) that rests on methodologies such as machine “learning,” 
knowledge “discovery” in databases, data “mining” and social media “intelligence.” 
Driven by possibilistic logics and iterative tinkering, these technologies aspire to 
persistent surveillance in unconventional warfare as well as policing. They are used to 
identify risk populations and to produce targets for the so-called “war on terror” (Graham 
2011; Krishnan 2015).v It is in this sense that “the act of targeting is an act of violence 
even before any shot is fired” (Weber 2005, 105). 
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Security as predictive technoscience rests on an “apparatus of distinction” (Perugini 
and Gordon 2017) that turns the suspect / enemy into an anticipatory target that can be 
“Found, Fixed, and Finished” (F3) with the help of information based on real-time 
tracking, data mining, and the imaginary of an omnipotent sensorium.  But the problem, 
as Carlo Caduff observes, “is that targets are always enmeshed and entangled in their 
environments” (2107, 318). Each of the papers in this special issue addresses the question 
of what it means to conceive of security as a technoscience of tracking and targeting, 
examining its realization in political imaginaries, investments in networked 
infrastructures, increasingly distributed divisions of social and technical labor, and acts of 
violence directed at those who are targeting’s objects. The connecting thread that joins 
these papers is the question of how force produces its translations from person, to enemy, 
to target.  The premise is not that violence produces its targets de novo, or that there are 
no circumstances in which violence might be justified as the defensive response to an 
“imminent threat.”vi  It is rather to focus on the dynamics through which systematic 
violence effectively creates worlds in which operations of tracking and targeting, done in 
the name of security, work as sociotechnologies of reciprocal (if also asymmetric) enmity 
and ongoing insecurity. While the focus is on state-sponsored or military operations, the 
arguments should have relevance for any forms of systematic violence. As violent force 
constitutes its objects through their translation as targets, so the authorization of targets, 
from individuals to populations, is a condition of possibility for violence’s governance 
and legitimation.    
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Permission to Engage 
An initial example might help to make these concerns more concrete. The documents 
released to Wikileaks by whistleblower Chelsea Manning (who at the time was an 
intelligence analyst deployed with the US Army in Iraq) in 2010 include the now-
infamous and chilling video of over a dozen people being targeted by the crew of a US 
Apache helicopter, tracking events on the ground in New Baghdad in July 2007.vii The 
recording from the helicopter’s sights has been augmented by a number of investigative 
and documentary accounts of the incident, including extensive testimony and 
commentary by US Army Infantry Specialist Ethan McCord who was on the ground, as 
well as family members of those who were killed.viii  Together these materials enable an 
all too rare glimpse of how sociotechnologies of military violence comprise their 
multiple, partially connected and tragically interacting targets.  Our primary view of the 
event as witnesses is through the cross hairs of the Apache attack helicopter, as the crew 
track persons on the ground walking in and around a square in a neighborhood of this 
Baghdad suburb, which the US Army was tasked in 2007 to “secure” against insurgents.  
We watch as the crew translate persons on the ground into targets, and hear them call 
with increasing zeal and urgency for “permission to engage” from their commanding 
officer.  In this process, cameras on the shoulders of two Reuters journalists are identified 
as weapons, rendering their bearers into combatants.  At the same time, a US Army 
Infantry unit is operating nearby, conducting what Infantry Specialist Ethan McCord 
describes as a routine (if much dreaded by both sides) form of patrol, as the unit moves 
through the neighborhood forcing entry into homes on what McCord characterizes as 
overwhelmingly pointless searches for evidence of “militia-related materials.”  At the 
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same time, McCord emphasizes the continuous threat faced by US personnel on these 
patrols from rooftop snipers, who aim at either the soldier’s exposed throat, or the 
femoral artery of the thigh.  In his commentary regarding the event, McCord explains that 
“the rules of engagement in 2007 when this happened were that, if you feel threatened, by 
anybody, you’re able to engage that person. Many soldiers felt threatened just by the fact 
that you were looking at them.”ix   
 McCord’s account provides a compelling sense of the extent to which US soldiers 
themselves are targets within the matrix of violence and hair trigger insecurity that 
constituted the US occupation of Baghdad in 2007, and with what consequence for those 
around them. The status of McCord’s own unit as a potential target on this occasion was 
a highly salient element in the justificatory framing on which the Apache helicopter crew 
based their own tracking.  Along with the misrecognized cameras, the video is readable 
for the outlines of an AK47 in the hands of one of another group of men walking near the 
square.  More salient still, as McCord explains to filmmaker Shuchen Tan, is a silhouette 
identifiable through the filter of professional military vision as a Rocket Propelled 
Grenade (RPG) launcher.  Given the weapon’s capability of shooting down a helicopter, 
McCord asserts that any Iraqi carrying an RPG in that area would (or at least should) 
know that they would be read as targeting the US military, and reciprocally as a 
legitimate target themselves.  So the stage is further set for the attack from the Apache 
crew that follows. 
 These logics become increasingly unsustainable following the attack, however, as 
we watch the Apache crew tracking a wounded and seriously disabled man (as it turns 
out, Reuters cameraman Saeed Chmagh) crawling to the side of the road towards a 
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nearby house.  We hear the crew, with increasing impatience, exhorting their target to 
“pick up a weapon,” to allow them to fire again and finish the job.x The tragedy deepens 
when a passing van stops next to the wounded man and several evidently unarmed 
civilians, including the resident of the house, work together to pick the man up and load 
him into the van’s hold. We hear the Apache crew reporting in to their commander the 
arrival of “a black SUV-uh Bongo truck,” a vehicle stereotypically associated with the 
insurgency (despite the fact that the van was blue, and didn’t fit that profile), which was 
“possibly picking up bodies and weapons.” This report finally produces the “permission 
to engage” for which the crew has been waiting.  They fire on the van, and in the 
aftermath we see the US Army patrol, including Ethan McCord, enter the scene.  In his 
description of the horrors of the aftermath, McCord recounts how on his approach to the 
van he found the passengers, a mortally wounded father and his two small children. We 
see McCord himself being tracked through the sites of the helicopter, as he runs with one 
of the two children in his arms to a Bradley armored personnel carrier for evacuation. As 
McCord conveys the report of the wounded children over the communications channel, 
we hear the helicopter crew’s response: “Oh Damn. Ah well, it’s their fault for bringing 
their kids into battle.”  As McCord points out in a subsequent testimony, however, this 
was not a battlefield but a residential neighborhood.xi  The wife of the driver of the van 
explains that her husband was traveling with the two children to visit a cousin nearby. 
And as the brother of one of the murdered journalists tells Tan in the film Permission to 
Engage that he is now prepared to kill the next American that he meets, we see the cycle 
of targeting, and the dynamics of insecurity, in their devastating self-perpetuation.    
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 The disparity between the zeal with which Manning herself was tracked and 
targeted following the release by Wikileaks of the video titled “Collateral Murder,” and 
the impunity granted to those responsible for the attack, underscores a central, and 
troubling, aspect of tracking and targeting operations undertaken by the United States and 
its allies in the name of security. At the same time that technologies of violence are 
elaborating, the legitimacy and efficacy of actions undertaken in the name of security is 
increasingly in question, and the clarity of distinctions that underwrite the international 
legal frameworks governing the conduct of military violence is being undone. Challenges 
to military violence are now coming from a range of actors within and beyond the nation 
state, and arguments are mounting to the effect that measures taken in the name of 
protection are themselves generative of the threats that they would claim to address.xii 
 Discussions of developments in military technologies have a tendency to drift 
towards debate over whether contemporary capabilities are significantly different from, 
their effects better or worse than, the systems that came before. Informed by STS, the 
papers collected here resist a preoccupation with resolving that debate in favor of careful 
tracking of both continuity and change in systems of technosecurity. The aim is to trace 
the shifting, somewhat slippery lines of reproduction and transformation within the 
historical, and ongoing, projection of force in the name of pre-emptive control, whether 
through renderings of bodies as differentially (in)visible, redistributions of sociotechnical 
agency, regimes of border protection, increasing reliance on data as a form of weaponry, 
or technosciences of identification between combatants and noncombatants. Working 
from multiple disciplinary perspectives including anthropology, history, law, political 
geography and sociology in conversation with STS, the papers engage framing discourses 
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and imaginaries of state security, military doctrine, military history, and international 
humanitarian/human rights law. The special issue’s connecting themes include the 
cultural politics of military visuality and its technological mediations; the performative 
effects of technologies of identification and categorization; and the ontological, 
epistemological, rhetorical and sociopolitical dimensions of contemporary 
sociotechnologies of surveillance and military force.  
Regimes of targeting and tracking 
What narrowing of vision is called for by the scopic regimesxiii of military violence, and 
more specifically for operations of tracking and targeting?  Only rarely does targeting 
find its objects through the positive identification of individuals: much more common are 
identifications defined through practices of profiling and categorization (see also 
M’charek et al 2014; Weber 2016).  Among the latter, a crucial axis is the separation of 
those who constitute an imminent threat from the rest, where the implication is that those 
making these discriminations are themselves the objects of potential violence from those 
being identified. And as the opening example demonstrates, however asymmetrical this 
relationship is, it is a reciprocal one.   
 In the context of what military geographer Derek Gregory has characterized as 
“everywhere war” (2011a), the boundaries of military and domestic security operations 
are increasingly elided, as the spatialities and temporalities of tracking and targeting are 
further extended.  The distinctions of domestic and foreign, and the associated logics of 
“us and them,” are enacted most explicitly at those sites constituted as the boundaries of 
the nation state.  In the case of immigration, Andersson (2014) argues that the 
securitization of borders is driven by interests of the “illegality industry,” that is, the 
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national and international agencies and private bodies engaged in the profitable business 
aspect of border management. By investing in and expanding the reach of surveillance 
and control mechanisms in an endless cycle, these actors increasingly displace people 
from legal routes and sites of migration, thus creating the phenomenon of migrant 
illegality that they then purport to combat.  In “Vision and Transterritory: The Borders of 
Europe,” Karolina Follis (2017) considers how sociotechnologies of surveillance are 
deployed in making the difference between the interiors of Europe and its constitutive 
outsides.  That these boundaries must be continually re-enacted through the policing of 
borders is at once a sign of the precariousness of that difference, and the depth of 
investment in its reiteration.  The always already virtual nature of state boundaries is 
given new meaning as new technologies enable what Follis characterizes as the 
transterritorial expansion of practices of border surveillance into the zone of the “pre-
frontier,” untethering the border-enforcing agencies of the state from the locations that 
delineate their geophysical boundaries.  This theater of operation arises in a context 
where insecurity has a double edge: the problem of the immigrant or refugee as potential 
terrorist on one hand, and the dangers faced by those attempting to emigrate––
particularly by water––on the other.  Conjoining new technologies of vision with 
expanding databases and security professionals, sociotechnical apparatuses like the 
European Surveillance System (Eurosur) are posited as simultaneous solutions to the 
threat to us and the danger to them, introducing new capacities for “pre-emptive” 
interdiction of those who are rendered as prospective border crossers, in the name of their 
rescue.  As Follis observes, there is money to be made by some, and lives at stake for 
others.  In the case of the latter, Follis argues, the vision of Eurosur allows EU member 
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states to see more in order to deflect the legal obligation to secure the human rights of 
migrants reaching their borders. 
 Practices of sorting at the border of the nation state are the offspring of military 
technosciences aimed at the differentiation of friend and enemy, us and them.  As Follis 
(2017) observes: “[i]n the military, the purpose of transterritorial vision is always 
operational; not just to see or record but to track and target that which is seen.”  The 
elaboration of data storage, analysis, and networked information systems expands the 
agencies and extends the categories through which the detection of bodies, their 
classification, and their translation into “targets of interest” (ibid.,) is enacted. So-called 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), remotely-piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), or drones 
are the most highly visible addition to the infrastructures that enable persistent 
surveillance and, in the most directly lethal instance, targeted killing. STS alerts us to the 
practices of translation involved here, as a body, a mobile signal, or an overloaded boat, 
within a space designated as out of place become signs to be registered.  Panoptic 
aspirations to situational awareness are instantiated instead as highly formatted and 
constrained modes of professional vision (Goodwin 1994), enacted by participants 
differently located and hierarchically ordered. 
 Within the frameworks of international law that govern armed conflict, perhaps 
the most salient difference is that between civilians and combatants. This is a distinction 
traditionally reliant upon a combination of location (whether off or on, outside or within 
the battlefield/battlespace) and other visual signifiers (the uniform of the professional 
soldier or the possession of an object identifiable as a weapon).  But as Christiane Wilke 
observes (2017), “While the distinction between civilians and combatants is fundamental 
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to international law, it is contested and complicated in practice… civilians are not clearly 
recognizable to those who have a mission to spare and protect them.”  It is by now well 
established that professional vision is both systematic and messy in its renderings.xiv 
Wilke’s careful recounting of an incident in Kunduz, Afghanistan in 2009 draws on an 
expanded sense of technologies of seeing informed by previous scholarship in STS and 
beyond, to include not only devices like aerial surveillance and thermal imaging, but also 
the epistemic/ontological (and especially moral) frames of reference that fill in the gaps 
and resolve the equivocality of those renderings in situ.  Key to the figures that result is 
that of the “civilian,” analyzed by Wilke not as a pre-existing or fixed entity but as at 
once stereotypic and precarious in its deployment as a subject position on the ground.  
The simple schema “friend/enemy” or “them/us” is vastly complicated by close analysis 
of contemporary sites and events of violent confrontation, both “at home” and “abroad.”  
Places (particular regions of a city, or of a countryside), objects (vehicles or tools), and 
subjects (men, women, and children) all embody ambiguities and uncertainties that at 
once heighten the stakes of accurate discrimination (for example, seeing the difference 
between a camera and a weapon), and render it elusive.  Diminishing time frames through 
the increasing automation of warfare, combined with increasingly complex and 
distributed networks of information and communication, further close down the space for 
deliberation or questioning.   
 In response to what Wilke characterizes as the “visual crisis” engendered by the 
absence of clear demarcations in so-called asymmetric wars, US military targeting 
increasingly focuses on data analysis and interpretation to extract “patterns of life,” 
including locations, associations and everyday movements (Wilke 2017). This is further 
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accompanied by the pressure to track “friendly” forces (particularly Troops in Contact, or 
allies operating on the ground), as their protection operates as an imperative more 
powerful than the protection of civilians.  At times of uncertainty, and highly influenced 
by dominant counterinsurgency doctrines, identification of the target shifts from the 
positive identification of persons to evidence of their “involvement” in unfolding 
activities.  This evidence is read, moreover, through visualities and organizational 
interactions that carry their own lines of affiliation and Othering, giving voice and 
silencing, and are deeply informed by legacies of colonialism in their renderings of raced 
and gendered bodies (Butler 2010).xv  Seeing is located, in this sense, not only in terms of 
position in relation to the scene at hand (on the ground, in the air, at a forward operating 
base, in a headquarters situation room, etc.), but also in contextualizing narratives 
regarding anticipated and unfolding events, as well as more extended biographies and 
histories.   
 A corollary of the increasingly troubled category of “civilian” as a touchstone of 
meaningful rules governing the use of violent force is the expansion of its others, 
including “militants,” “insurgents,” “supporters,” and “sympathizers.”  As Gregory 
(2014) observes: “The politico-cultural construction of a wider ‘landscape of threat’ is 
crucial to the production and performance of a specific ‘space of the target.’” Gregory 
focuses on what he characterizes as “political technologies of vision” as they are 
deployed in the mediatization and legitimation of military violence.  The mandate to track 
and target enemy combatants belies what Jon Lindsay (2017) characterizes as a 
“sprawling but less-storied system of data production behind the scenes” of military 
operations by the US and its allies.  Offering an account of his experience at a Forward 
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Operating Base (FOB) in Anbar province in Iraq from 2007-08, Lindsay examines the 
data practices and “epistemic infrastructures” developed in support of US Navy Special 
Operations.  Expanded to encompass the “exploitation” of intelligence extracted from 
target persons and its “analysis” for relevance to further targeting, the protocol of Find, 
Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze (F3EA) is a technology of counter-terrorism that 
rationalizes operations animated by the privileged visualities of hunting and killing.xvi  
Counter-terrorism operations posit each raid as an opportunity for the extraction of 
“intelligence” contributing to the eventual “decapitation” of an insurgent organization, 
figured as an underlying structure of which each person detained or killed is a visible 
manifestation.  Lindsay develops the trope of “data friction” to explore the 
simultaneously interfering and facilitating effects of messy data practices at the FOB.  
His account provides a critical participant’s analysis of the tensions and contradictions 
within an operation framed in terms of rebuilding, in a context in which, as he writes, the 
“epistemic infrastructure amplified the preferences of the Naval Special Warfare 
community rather than clarified the social reality of Anbar Province” (2017). This is a 
kindred form of “closed world” (Edwards 1996) to the imaginary of nuclear command 
and control, one in which a preference for violence trumps a commitment to non-violent 
engagement in the service of understanding.  The information infrastructures that Lindsay 
describes are far from smoothly functioning, and cultures of war fighting systematically 
co-opt labors of knowledge making and reconciliation in the service of what Lindsay 
aptly names “target practice” as a dominant mode of operation. 
 The epistemic infrastructures generated through mundane data practices at the 
Forward Operating Base are themselves enabled by the configuration of “remote split” 
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operations traced historically and ethnographically by Elish (2017).  Attending to the 
work of war fighting, Elish shifts our focus from the trope of the “unmanned” aerial 
vehicle to the labor-intensive, hidden infrastructures and distributed sociotechnical 
networks that comprise drone operations.  She expands the frame temporally as well, to 
join contemporary drone operations to earlier apparatuses of tracking and targeting 
configured in Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the Balkans, as well as to the military 
biographies of their operators:  
I argue that a critical point of intervention is to maintain focus on the extent to 
which robotic and autonomous technologies are shaped by humans and must be 
continually maintained, operated and authorized. As with previous transitions in the 
history of automation, new technologies do not so much do away with the human 
but rather obscure the ways in which human labor and social relations are 
reconfigured (2017). 
Elish resists a narrative of simple or linear technological progression in favor of an 
account that tracks the history of technopolitical logics, which in conversation with the 
expansion of systems analysis, electronic sensing, and networked communications, 
configure the distributed labors of remote split operations.  Beginning with 
instrumentation of the pathways through which bodies and equipment were moved by the 
Viet Cong, and their networking with “sensor-shooter gunships” and associated bases 
engaged in signals analysis, remote split enabled the real-time tracking of body 
“signatures” presumed by their position on the ground to be legitimate targets (2017).  
Infamously in the case of Vietnam, the statistics generated as evidence of the success of 
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these operations were as unreliable as the signals taken to be the proof of enemy 
movements.   
 The lineages that Elish traces include a history of deeply troubled boundaries 
between zones of conflict and civilian spaces.xvii  In their critical examination of the 
principle of distinction as a founding premise of International Humanitarian Law, 
Perugini and Gordon observe that “analyzing the way distinction is produced, its 
epistemic conditions of possibility, as well as its political and ethical objectives is both 
necessary and urgent” (2017, 1).  They make the more radical argument that far from a 
framework for the protection of civilian life, the principle has become a means to 
legitimate the killing of noncombatants in war, by “destabilizing the boundaries of an 
existing legal figure—civilian—and creating malleable figures of targetable subjects and 
spaces” (ibid, 17).  Developments in technologies of tracking and targeting are central to 
their argument, in particular the elaboration of what they name the “apparatus of 
distinction” that increasingly relies upon data analytics and the mobilization of figures 
such as “human shields” and “enemies killed in action” as salient legal entities (ibid., 2; 
see also Butler 2015).  The apparatus has a threefold function:  
it is used to gather intelligence through surveillance and reconnaissance, it directs 
the deployment of violence during the fighting, and it interprets the meaning of 
violence before, during and after the fighting so as to claim that violence was 
utilized in accordance with international law and is consequently ethical (ibid, 14). 
At the same time, the apparatus itself is generative of liminal or threshold positions that 
offer cover and a resource for justifying violence deployed against persons who might 
otherwise be protected.xviii  It is only through post hoc investigation that the status of 
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those killed and their legitimacy as targets can be disputed or confirmed, and the forensic 
aftermath of an airstrike invariably produces divergent accounts and contested counts of 
“civilian casualties.”  Following Wilke (2017), in this space of contestation and the 
operations themselves the instability of the category of civilian manifests not only as an 
abiding problem for international law, but also as an enabling condition for the impunity 
of military operations.  This is terrain rife with claims to legitimizing categorization, of 
“insurgents,” “armed militants,” and the like, on one hand, and counter-accusations of 
“children,” “civilians,” or even armed but not threatening adults targeted, on the other.   
 It is our hope that the papers collected here contribute to an understanding of the 
irremediable uncertainties and deep-seated preconceptions inherent in discriminations 
between those persons who pose danger and those who are deserving of protection, 
including the specificities of to, and by whom, that protection is to be granted.  Perhaps 
most importantly, these papers raise the question of who is entitled to make such 
judgments, and who are rendered as their objects. The number of actors, state and non-
state, involved in securitization through tracking and targeting is growing and their 
accountability structures are increasingly opaque. On whose behalf do these agents 
exercise their power to decide who is to be killed, who ought to be spared and who 
abandoned?  It has been argued that the blurring of boundaries between security, law 
enforcement and war reflects the “re-articulation and expansion of state sovereignty into 
new spaces and arenas” (Jones and Johnson 2016, 188). Sovereign states and “their 
agents and intermediaries” (ibid. 195) exercise their authority in contexts that are 
increasingly shielded from scrutiny by means of traditional mechanisms of democratic 
oversight. The responsibility to establish accounts of what actually happens in the course 
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of air strikes, drone surveillance, and special operations to “kill or capture” falls to 
networks of activists, advocates and reporters in the transnational civil society.   
Interrogating the claims and counter-claims that arise in this context is crucial to 
accountability and adjudication of the distinction between justifiable killing and murder.  
Taken together, the evidence presented lends further weight to arguments against 
the growing investment in sociotechnologies developed in the name of security.  Such 
investment is on the rise because of the profitable dynamics of the security-industrial 
complex (Carmel 2016; Lemberg-Pedersen 2013) and the well-documented politics of 
fear, which manifest as the “nationalistic restriction of the concept of protection” 
(Chamayou 2012, 139).  As criteria of distinction increasingly fail the scopic regimes on 
which military operations rely, the promise of security through tracking, targeting, and 
violence is further undermined. The problems of international governance and 
accountability under the existing laws of armed combat deepen when we recognize that 
and how those legal regimes were developed historically “with a specific spatiotemporal 
imaginary of war in mind: wars between Western nation states, not wars of colonial 
conquest or anticolonial insurgency … In this logic, where there are no legitimate 
combatants, there are no legitimate civilians” (Wilke 2017).  The historical legacies that 
haunt the figure of the civilian, along with the “irregularity” of contemporary war 
fighting, render Other bodies vulnerable to sociotechnologies of tracking and targeting in 
ways that profoundly undermine the latter’s promise of protection. The insecurities that 
result pervade those territories that are the target of contemporary military operations 
conducted in the name of the securitization of the “homeland.”  Far from a matter of 
recognition of what is already there, moreover, acts of tracking and targeting in these 
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circumstances are generative of their objects, as those who feel threatened by persons of 
uncertain affiliation render the latter legible through their assignment to newly authorized 
categories, like “unlawful combatant” or “militant.” In this sense, ambiguity in the 
categorization of persons according to the binary of “civilian/combatant” is not a problem 
for the perpetration of warfare, but rather an opportunity for the expansion of those 
bodies/persons claimed as legitimate targets.  The generative qualities of tracking and 
targeting are evident here not only in the sense that professional vision enacts its objects, 
but also insofar as injuries felt as unjust inspire injury in return.  The “somewhere in 
particular” (Haraway 1988: 590) that informs the optics of military operations is now 
subject to close and critical inspection within STS and related fields, in ways that might 
help to disclose the brutality and ultimate fallibility of the pursuit of security through 
technopolitical logics that threaten to regenerate, if not expand, the fields of enmity and 
injustice that they are ostensibly designed to eradicate. 
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i https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war\  
ii http://www.reprieve.org.uk/topic/drones/ 
iii In the area of the FATA, Gregory (2017, 29) observes that these operations are 
performed within “a profoundly biopolitical space whose execution depends on a series 
of similarly biopolitical technologies: seemingly neutral, “objective” devices and 
practices—including target lists, databases, signals intercepts and visual feeds—that work 
to make the borderlands all too visible as an array of targets for the just-in-time killing 
that characterizes so much of later modern war.” He continues “Although the constitution 
of the FATA as a space of exception explains how their inhabitants are routinely and 
deliberately exposed to state violence, it cannot account for the mistakes made in the 
execution of a program of remote killing that has been hailed by [former Director of the 
National Security Agency] Hayden as ‘the most precise and effective application of 
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firepower in the history of armed conflict' ... an analysis by Reprieve showed that 24 men 
were targeted multiple times in the FATA, leaving 874 other people dead in their wake, 
including 142 children. On average, 36 other people, usually unknown and un-named, 
have been killed for every intended target” (ibid., 51).  We return to the problematic 
category of the “civilian” below. 
iv For an exploration of the intimate relations between values of transparency and 
technologies of surveillance see the special issue of ST&HV on “Data Shadows” edited 
by Leonelli, Rappert, and Davies (2017). 
v While a series of Executive Orders in the 1970s and early 1980s (by Presidents Ford, 
Carter, and Reagan) prohibited assassination by anyone acting on behalf of the United 
States government, in the name of the “War on Terror” the Bush and the Obama 
administrations have circumvented those restrictions in the case of drone-mediated 
targeted killings by invoking the September 2001 House and Senate joint Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force.  It is now asserted that in the case of those identified as 
terrorist groups in designated areas, targeted killings are legally justifiable as acts of war. 
vi In his analysis of targeting operations initiated by the Obama Administration under the 
rubric of the so-called war on terror, Gregory (2017:43) observes that US policy “cites 
the ‘continuing and imminent threat’ posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban from their 
sanctuaries in Pakistan to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and to the continental United States; 
this ‘elongates’ the concept of imminence, as the State Department’s legal adviser Harold 
Koh put it, and reaffirms the doctrine of self-defense so that the strikes are deemed to be 
legitimate preemptive actions against enemies of the United States.”  For a critique of the 
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US drone program, including its reliance on an extended reading of “imminent threat,” 
see also Calhoun 2015. 
vii See https://collateralmurder.wikileaks.org/. 
viii Shuchen Tan’s documentary film, Permission to Engage is available in full at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2012/08/2012823616123717.html 
ix http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2012/08/2012823616123717.html. 
x https://collateralmurder.wikileaks.org/en/transcript.html.   
xi https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWOIv12lZi0. This comment echoes a familiar 
refrain in contemporary military operations; that is, the premise that civilian deaths 
within urban areas are the either the responsibility of those who insist on continuing to 
inhabit those spaces or of the opposing side, most explicitly in the figuration of non-
combatants as “proximate human shields” (Perugini and Gordon 2017, 14).  It is worth 
noting in this case that as the helicopter crew is constructing its target, the father of the 
two children in the van would not know whether they were being targeted by the 
helicopter overhead, or protected from combatants in the surrounding area.  Those on the 
ground cannot know their place in the unfolding events until the missile strikes. 
xii Bigo (2014) examines the concept of (in)securitization; that is, the phenomenon 
whereby security does not diminish insecurity.  Regarding drone strikes in Pakistan, 
counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen and former Army Officer McDonald Exum 
caution in a 2009 opinion piece in the New York Times that “Every one of these dead 
noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more 
recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as the drone strikes 
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have increased” (NY Times, May 17, 2009: 202-3). This effect is not unfamiliar to the 
intelligence community who understand that many acts of political violence are not 
random, but rather instances of what they call “blowback,” or provoked revenge for 
covert operations (Johnson 2002).  
xiii Derek Gregory (2011b) has developed the trope of “scopic regimes” to articulate the 
material-semiotic visualities of military geographies and operations.      
xiv There is an extensive body of scholarship within STS on the practices and politics of 
seeing, including the practice-specific renderings that seeing performs.  See for example 
Hacking 1983; Lynch 1985, 1988; Lynch et al. 1990; Coopmans et al. 2014; Myers 2015.  
xv For an examination of how lines of affiliation and Othering are enforced through a 
military training simulation see Suchman 2016. 
xvi The configuration of the armed drone as a “hunter-killer” operation has been analyzed 
extensively by Chamayou (2014), and developed further by Gregory (2015, 2017). 
xvii This history includes examples of much more indiscriminate targeting as well in the 
case of air force, most horrifically in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the 
United States in 1945.  That case underscores the deadly maneuvering room afforded by 
the laws of armed conflict through the Principle of Proportionality, which allocates to 
military command the cost benefit calculus of how many non-combatant lives can be 
sacrificed in the name of military advantage. 
xviii Perugini and Gordon offer as an example the Israeli military practice in its 2014 
attack on Gaza of “tapping” a building in order to designate its status as a military target.  
The small bombs used for this purpose are intended as warnings; those who fail to heed 
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the warning by leaving the building have, by this logic, confirmed their own status as 
legitimate targets for more lethal operations. 
